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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an action for recovery of certain
profit sharing benefits pursuant to a Profit Sharing and
Retirement Plan of the Defendant, P M Engineers, Inc., and the
Counterclaim of P M Engineers, Inc. for breach of contract.

DISPOSITION BY THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
Jn the 19th day of April, 1976, upon Plaintiff James M.
Burrows' Motion for Stunrnary Judgment, a hearing was had in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before
the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin.

On the 5th day of

~ay,

1976,

the Court entered Summary Judgment for the Plaintiff and against
the Defendant and dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim with
prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the Summary Judgment vacated and
remanded for trial or in the alternative for Summary Judgment
for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff.
STATEMENTS OF THE FACTS
From May, 1959, to January 7, 1975, the Plaintiff, James
M. Burrows, was an employee of p M Engineers, Inc.

(TR-141).

During that period of time, the Defendant, P M Engineers, Inc.,
had in force and effect a Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan
of Library.
which
thefor Plaintiff
was
member
(TR-228)
Sponsored (TR-71-163)
by the S.J. Quinney Law
Funding
digitization provided
by theaInstitute
of Museum
and Library· Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

During 1974, the Plaintiff in his capacity as an employee of
P M Engineers, Inc. worked as an inspector at the Main Post Office
project (TR-210).

In his capacity as an inspector at the Main Post

Office project, the Defendant removed material from the construction
site.

(TR-473-476).

Said removal of materials was without authori-

zation of PM Engineers, Inc.

(Deposition of Paul Mc Gill at Page 71).

Additionally, while a stockholder and employee of Defendant corporation, Plaintiff worked for outside firms which were in direct
competition with the Defendant (TR-494-495), and charged Defendant
corporation with unauthorized mileage and overtime (TR-512-514).
While an employee of the Defendant corporation, the Plaintiff
herein became a member of the company's Profit Sharing Plan.

As

a member of that Plan, the Plaintiff was entitled to certain contingent benefits by virtue of contributions made solely by Defendant corporation to the Profit Sharing Plan (TR-78, 81, 82, 85,
87, 88).

Pursuant to the terms of said Profit Sharing Plan, the

rights to the benefits were subject to divestment when a member
of said Plan is terminated for Material Dishonesty or failure to
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors (TR-91), and further
subject to payment of benefits over a period of years not to exceed
ten years if payment of benefits is appropriate (TR-85).

When

the Plaintiff had been terminated, the Defendant corporation
notified the Admi~istrative Conunittee of the Profit Sharing Plan
that said termination of the Plaintiff was for acts it considered
to be materially dishonest (Exhibit P-4 Deposition of Paul Mc Gill)
and failure to follow the instructions of the Board of Directors.
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The Administrative Committee upheld the determination of the
Board of Directors and then notified the Plaintiff of the determination and invoked the Plan procedures, which called for arbi·
tration of the dispute between the parties.
between 164 and 165, and TR-178).

( TR-unn urnbe red page;

The Plaintiff then refused

to arbitrate and filed this law suit (TR-506).
The Defendant corporation answered said law suit and filed
its own Counterclaim, claiming damages by virtue of those acts
perpetrated against the Defendant corporation by the Plaintiff
(TR-204-212).

That in addition, punitive damages are being sougt

by way of counterclaim based on the malicious actions of the
Defendant, both prior to and subsequent to the filing of this
action, which acts were intended to harm and to damage all of thE
Defendants herein (TR-204-212).

On the 5th day of April, 1976,

Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (TR-348).

The

matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwi·
on the 19th day of April, 1976 (TR-350).

On the 5th day of May,

1976, the Court entered the following Order:
1.
"Plaintiff be the same is hereby awarded
Judgment against the Defendants, P M Engineers,
Inc., Paul Mc Gill, Richard K. Klein, and Gail
0. Payne, as the Administrative Committee of the
Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan of P M Engineers,
Inc., in the sum of $21,406.50 (which sum represents
the balance of the Plaintiff's Profit Sharing
Account as of December 31, 1974, in the sum of
$25,183.06 with 85% vesting), together with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from Janaury 1, 1975
to the date of this judgment, the sum of $1,712.45
together with interest at the rate of 8% from the
date hereof until paid, and the Plaintiff's costs
and disbursements.
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2.
The_claim of ~lai~tiff's fo7 punitive damages
for wrongful termination of Plaintiff and attorney's
fees, ~ursuant to the Utah Statute relating to
wag7s is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon
merits.
3'.
~he cow:iterclaim of the Defendants is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits."
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FllmING THAT THERE WERE NO MATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT.
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for Sununary
Judgment.

Section (C) of the rule specifically provides as follows:
" ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, dispositions and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

In order for a Motion for Summary Judgment to be granted,
there must be no material issues of fact in dispute, so as to
entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.
Disabled American Veterans vs Hendrixson, 9 U. 2d. 152, 340
P. 2d 416.
The Court in determining whether or not to grant Summary
Judgment must view the facts in a light most advantageous to
the nonmoving party, and must resolve all doubts in favor of
permitting the nonmoving party to go to trial and grant the
Motion only when no right to recovery or setoff could be established.
See Controlled Receivables, Inc. vs Harmon, )7 U. 2d 420, 413 P.
2d 807

(1956); Foster vs Steed, 19

u.

2d 435, 432 P. 2d 60

(1967); Thompson vs Ford Motor Company, 16 U. 2d 30, 395 P.
2d 62

(1964).
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Since a Summary Judgment prevents litigents from fully
presenting their case in Court, therefore the Court should be
reluctant to invoke this harsh remedy. Brandt vs Springville
Banking Company, 10 U. 2d 350, 353 P. 2d 460.

The remedy of

Summary Judgment is invoked only in cases where the favored parti
makes a showing which precludes as a matter of law awarding
of any relief to the losing party.

Brenner vs Utah Poultry and

Farmers Co-op, 11 U. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18.
be granted with great caution.

Summary Judgment shoL

Watkins vs Simonds, 11 u. 2d 46,

354 P. 2d 852.
Finally the Court, in review of a pre-trial Summary Judgmer
of dismissal must accept the facts as the Appellant contends thet
to be.

Reliable Furniture Company vs Fidelity and Guarantee

Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16

u.

2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685.

In the present case, the lower Court made two determinatior
which were inconsistent with the rules and cases cited above.
Said inconsistencies are treated below.
A.
A FINDING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MAK!
A DETERMINATION OF FORFEITURE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In his decision of May 5, 1976,

(TR-432) the Honorable

Earnest F. Baldwin stated:
"That the Defendants failed to follow provisions
of the Profit Sharing Plan, having failed to make
a "Determination of Forfeiture" as required by the
Plan and having failed to establish the right to
forfeit the Plaintiff's Profit Sharing account, are
not entitled to retain the funds due Plaintiff and
the Defendants having failed to determine the funds
would be paid to the Plaintiff over a period of time
and having failed to follow the provisions of the PlU
are obligated to pay Plaintiff the sums due the
Plaintiff, together with interest accrued thereon."
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It is respectfully submitted that the question whether or
not the Committee failed to follow the Provisions of the Profit
Sharing Plan presents a genuine issue of material fact, and
therefore Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been
denied and at the very least the matter should have been reserved
for trial.

The Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan of p M

Engineers, Inc., Article VI, Paragraph 7 (TR-91) provides:
"If a participant's status as an employee ceases
because of his discharge from employment for material
dishonesty or material violation of, or refusal to
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors of
the Company, the Company shall promptly notify the
Conunittee of the discharge of a participant for either
of these causes and the Committee shall determine
whether the Company had just cause for such discharge.
Any determination by the Committee that the provisions
of this Article are applicable shall be made within
ten (10) days after the receipt by the Committee of
notice of discharge, and written notice of such
termination shall be given by the Committee to the
employee, addressed by registered mail to his last
known address. Within twenty (20) days after the mailing
of such notice, the former employee may appeal for
arbitration from the determination of the Committee.
Failure to appeal within that time shall constitute
an irrevocable consent by the former employee to
the determination of the Committee."
The Plan provisions therefore require (a) that the Board of
Directors of the Company promptly notify the Committee of the
discharge of a participant for either material dishonesty or material
violation of, or refusal to follow the instructions of the Board of
Directors of the Company;

(b) the Committee must determine whether

the Company had just cause for such discharge;

(c) within ten

(10) days notify the employee that the provisions of the Plan are
applicable in his case;

(d) give such notice by registered mail.
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As noted above, the Plaintiff, James M. Burrows, was notified of
his termination on the 26th day of December, 1974, which said
termination became effective on the 7th day of January, 1975.
There is no evidence on the record to indicate the date upon wh;
the Board of Directors notified the Administrative Committee of
their determination that the Plaintiff had been terminated for
cause; however, the minutes of the meeting of the Administrative
Committee which was held February 21, 1975 (Exhibit P-4, Deposit:
of Paul Mc Gill) reflect as follows:
"The Committee has been notified by the Board
of Directors of P M Engineers, Inc. that all of
these employees have been terminated by management
because of acts during the past year which it considered to be dishonest and not in the best interest
of PM Engineers, Inc., of which they were all stockholders."
" ... Mr. Green stated that if the terminations were
for material dishonesty or refusal to follow the
instructions of the Board of Directors, as the
letter from the Board has stated, that no funds
could be distributed under any circumstances until
the Committee had determined whether or not the
provisions of the Plan were applicable and, if so,
that those employees be asked to arbitrate to
determine the facts surrounding their actions."
"The Committee determined unanimously that the
actions were serious enough to warrant the arbitration
and Mr. Mc Gill stated that there were unanswered
questions which had to be resolved prior to the
distribution of any funds.
He further stated that
the Plan had provided a means to determine the fact
and that those means should be utilized at this time.
Mr. Mc Gill stated
question should be
the story could be
up immediately and

that all of the employees in
contacted so that their side of
told and the matter could be cleared
the first distribution made."

On the 24th day of February, 1975, the Administrative Committee
notified the Plaintiff Burrows of their determination which was
sent by registered letter, return receipt requested (TR-178) ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Therefore, the uncontroverted facts indicate that Plaintiff was
terminated because of certain dishonest acts perpetrated by him,
that the Board of Directors so notified the Administrative Committee, that the Cormnittee agreed with the determination of the
Board of Directors, and so notified the Plaintiff of their
determination.

Once this was accomplished, the burden shifted

to the Plaintiff to call for arbitration within twenty (20) days.
Plaintiff failed to call for the arbitration and instead filed
a law suit some fifty-one (51) days after receipt of said notification (TR-508-509) .

Provisions of the Plan provide that his

failure to appeal within the time then constituted an irrevocable
consent by the former employee to the determination that the
Committee made relative thereto (TR-91).

Therefore, it is respect-

fully submitted that forfeiture is an automatic process prusuant
to the applicable provisions of the Plan, and as a matter of law,
Defendants are entitled to Judgment in their favor.
It may be argued that genuine issues of a material fact
remain. The primary one would be whether or not the Committee made
their determination within the prescribed ten (10) day period.
In addition, factual issues may remain whether the acts of the
Plaintiff constituted material dishonesty or failure to follow
the instructions of the Board of Directors.
dealt with in Point B below.

The latter will be

However, if the Court finds that

factual issues remain relative to the ten (10) day period should
reverse and remand for trial on this particular issue.
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B.

WHETHER DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO FORFEIT
THE PROFIT SHARING ACCOUNT, RAISES GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATER!~
FACTS AND THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FINDING AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RIGHT.
As a second basis for its ruling the lower Court stated
in its Summary Judgment that the Defendants failed to establish
the "right" to forfeit the Plaintiff's Profit Sharing account.
This parcicular statement is unclear, since the right to forfeit
is provided by the Plan itself, which obligates rather than grant:
a right to the Administrative Committee to forfeit in certain
situations.

This being the case, the Defendants need not

establish the right, and the Court erred in placing the added
burden on the Defendants.
If, on the other hand, the Court's contention relative to
Defendants' failure to establish the so-called right to forfeit,
relates to whether or not the reasons for termination constitute
material dishonesty or material violation of, or refusal to follow
the instructions of the Board of Directors, then we have an
entirely different question.
Here, it is appropriate that we review the acts of Mr. Burro··
which Defendants have complained and which ultimately led to his
termination and established a basis for the right to forfeit.
Those acts are:

(a) the unauthorized removal of materials from

the Main Post Office project; (b) removal of materials from the

Ma:

Post Office project during working hours (TR-253, 254, 255 and
Deposition of Oscar Whitten at pa1;e 7); {c) working for competitor!
or clients of P M Engineers, Inc. while an employee of that firm
(TR-258); (d) that Plaintiff charged PM Engineers, Inc. for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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unauthorized mileage and unauthorized overtime.

Since the lower

Court had before it a Motion for Summary Judgment, these facts
are assumed to be true.

The question then became whether these

acts constituted material dishonesty or failure to follow the
instructions of the Board of Directors, so as to cause the Plan
provisions relative to forfeiture to become operative.
The lower Court addressed itself to this particular
question and found that, as a matterof law, the acts of the
Plaintiff did not constitute material dishonesty or the failure
to follow the instructions of the Board of Directors.

At pages

477 through 482 of the transcript of the hearing on the Motion
for Summary Judgment, the Court discussed a theory that the acts
of the Plaintiff had to relate to his employment in order that
the right to forfeit be invoked and, once again, the Court found,
as a matter of law, these acts did not relate to his employment
and, therefore, the right to forfeit was not established.
Clearly, the alleged acts perpetrated by the Plaintiff
relate to employment.

Certainly, the removal of materials from

a Government project by a contract administrator's inspector
during working hours, the working for competitors of the Defendant,
and the unauthorized mileage and overtime charges relate to
Plaintiff's employment.

There is a conflict in the record relating

to these particular acts and whether the acts do, in fact, relate
to employment, they raise material issues of fact which the trier
of fact must decide at time of trial.

If capable of proof at

time of trial, Defendant's right to forfeit would thereby be
established.
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It is submitted, therefore, that the lower Court found
said acts of dishonesty not to be material.

The word "material'

is an often used term of art and is synonymous with substantial
Lewandoski vs Finkel, 129 Conn. 526 29 A. 2d 762.

Both termt

obscure and incapable of determination as a matter of law.

The:

words closely relate to those found in wrongful discharge
cases where a primary issue is whether or not an employer had
"good" and sufficient cause for discharge.

Once again, these

words are obscure and where the record contains conflict in thi:
regard, the question is one that a jury must decide.
Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530.

Robe1ts~

Here the facts conflk

The issue of materiality must be reserved for time of trial.
Plaintiff admits working for competitors' clients or
perspective clients (TR-258).

Defendants contend that the work:

for competitors falls within the framework of failing to follOi
the instructions of the Board of Directors in that said

actsw~

clearly in violation of by-laws of Defendant corporation as we!
as policies thereof.
It can be argued that the Plan provisions relate only to
participant's status as an employee and the by-laws would there:
not be applicable.

However, the Plaintiff was a stockholder as

well as an employee, as was every other member of the Plan·

Tt

by-laws do constitute policies of management of the corporatior
(Section 16-19-25 U.C.A. 1953); therefore, the policies would
reach the Plaintiff in his capacity as an employee-stockholdM·
The act of working for a competitor then would constitute a fai
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to follow the instructions of the Board of Directorspursuant
to the Plan provisions.
The record supports the proposition that alleged acts charged
do fall within the scope of material dishonesty or failure to
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors.

The Plaintiff

raises the point that Defendants' investigation disclosed certain
dishonest acts after the fact (TR-469).

Because of this,

Plaintiff contends that the Court need take cognizance only of
the one act alleged -- that of removing the material from the
Government project.

This, however, should not be the case.

So long as the grounds exist, or Plaintiff has portrayed
materially dishonest acts or acts which constitute failure to
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors during the
term of employment, the immediate reason for dismissal is not
that important.
901, Kike

VS

See Bon Heyme vs Tompkins, 89 Minn. 77, 93 N.W.

Bank Sav. L Ins. Co., 37 N.M. 346, 23 p 2d. 163.

These cases did not relate specifically to Profit Sharing Plans,
but rather were wrongful discharge cases.
have application here.

They do, however,

The cases hold that it is sufficient

that grounds existed at the time of discharge, Marnon vs Vaughn,
189 Or. 339, 119 p 2d 366, and further hold that it is not
material that the employer assign another grounds as the cause
for dismissal.

Haag vs Renell, 28 Wash., 2d. 883, 184 P 2d. 442.
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Therefore, all of Plaintiff's acts should be considered
as the proverbial "straws" in the determination of whether
Defendants established the right to forfeit.

That determination

is a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the trier
of fact and not on motion for Summary Judgment.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
SHOULD PAY BENEFITS IN A LUMP SUM WITH INTEREST THEREON.

DEFENDAl~

In its Summary Judgment, the lower Court ordered that all
of Plaintiff's benefits be paid with interest thereon.

ArticleV

Paragraph 2, of the Profit Sharing Plan (TR-85) provides that
payment of benefits in cases of termination may be made over a
peirod of years if the Committee so elects.

The election is to

be made within sixty (60)days of termination and cannot be controlling here insofar as Plaintiff is concerned since the issue
of termination and payment of benefits has undergone judicial

pm

The Profit Sharing Plan of Defendant, PM Engineers, Inc.,
gives rise to contractual obligations on the part of the employer
and employee.

Russel vs Princeton Laboratories, Inc., 321 A 2d. I

N.J. (1967), Frazer and Torbett, CPA's vs Kunkel, 401 P.2d. 476
(Okla.).

It has been held that a discharged employee was not

entitled to immediate payment of vested benefits in profit sharin\
plans, but must abide by the employer's decision to defer payment.
See Lano vs Rochester Germicide co., 261 Minn. 556, 113 N.W., 2d.
Here the Plan provides for deferred payments, is contractual and
the Court erred in ruling otherwise.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS CONTENTION THAT AS A MATTER
OF LAW DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR CLAIMS
ARISING OUT OF THEIR COUNTERCLAIM BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL
DUTY ARISING OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.
Section 16-19-25, U.C.A., 1953 supra, provides that by-laws
may contain provisions for the regulation and management of a
corporation.
Under the presumption which imputes notice of corporate
by-laws, Sterling vs Head Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction,

w.

of

w.,

28 U. 526, 80 P. 375 (1905), by-laws which are within the corporate
powers to adopt, bind the stockholders insofar as their rights
are concerned, whether they have expressly consented ta them or
not.

Ainsworth vs Southwestern Drug Corporation, 95 Fed. 2d 172,

and more recently in Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. vs Rocky Mountain
Chapter National Electrical Contractors Assn., 370 Fed 2d 463.
With regard to the relationship established between the
stockholders in the corporation by the by-laws which are in
existence at the inception of the relationship, the general
rule is that a contract has been entered into between the
stockholders and the corporation.

Schroeter vs Barlett Syndicate

Bldg. Corporation, 8 CAL. 2d. 12, 63 P. 2d 284.

Said by-laws

thus become an integral part of said contract or are in the
nature and have the same force and effect of a contract as regards
the rights between the corporation and the shareholders.

In re:

Campbell county Hardware Company, 15 F. 2d 78, and should be
construed just as any other contract.

Toler vs Clark Rural

Electric Cooperative Corporation, Ky. 512 S.W. 2d 25 (1974).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

By-Law No. VI of the By-Laws of P M Engineers, Inc. state
as follows:
"All stockholders agree that any remuneration
to them by an outside firm or individual for work
performed of a nature engaged in by the corporation
are monies or value due and payable to the corporation
In order words, stockholders may not engage in outside
engineering or related services as an individual, nor
may one or more stockholder enter into a business wh~
provides such service and is intended to generate
individual profit."
(Deposition of Paul Mc Gill,
Exhibit P-1).
"This paragraph illustrates the intent and wish and
reason for the birth of this corporation, to-wi;::
the welding together of individual abilities of the
stockholders in a team for the mutual benefit of the
corporation and themselves. Furthermore, it is the
intent and wish that each stockholder receive monetary
benefit in direct proportion to his output, both
efficiency wise and work wise. Therefore, in consequence, there will be no reason for outside work on
the part of the stockholder and a high incentive
remaining."
It is important to note that the above By-Law is to be rea:
in the light of By-Law No. IV which provides with only one excep·
that stock may be sold only to individuals actively employed by
the corporation.

(Deposition of Paul Mc Gill, Exhibit P-1).

Reading the two By-Laws together, we see the sense of By-Law
No. VI, which was intended to mutually bind the stockholders
in a mutually rewarding venture.

It further intended to restric:

and direct the energies of the stockholder-employee toward speci:
corporate ends.

It was not intended to restrict one's activiti~

after he was no longer a stockholder.

Thus, it does not become

a restraintive trade nor attempt to restrict one's right to seel
employment whenever, or wherever, he so desires.

Rather, the

stockholder-employee simply agrees not to work for competitin9
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firms or clients so long as he continues that unique stockholderemployee relationship.

If he does work for competiting firms,

then pursuant to the contract, he is required to pay to the corporation those sums received while working for the competiting
company.
The By-Law in question was in existence at the inception
of P M Engineers, Inc. and at the time the Plaintiff became a
stockholder therein.

Thus, pursuant to those cases cited above,

said By-Law becomes a binding, contractural obligation on him.
The lower Court in finding otherwise erred,

Finding that as a

matter of law, that Defendants did not have the right to their
recovery.

Once again, if the Defendants could prove a breach

of contract and their damages at time of trial, they would be
entitled to judgment in their favor.

Therefore, it is submitted

that this Honorable Court should reverse and remand for trial
on the issues.
CONCLUSION
The Appellants are part of a company which established a
non-contributory profit sharing program to benefit employees.
The Plan placed certain contractual obligations on employer and
employees alike.

We have been primarily concerned with those

provisions relating to payment of benefits where the employee is
terminated for acts constituting material dishonesty or failure
to follow instructions of the Board of Directors of said company.
It is Appellants' position that the record is full of conflicts
relating to material issues of fact and the Court erred in finding
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as a matter of law that no dispute exists and that PlaintiffRespondent was entitled to judgment.
Appellants' brief has pointed out said conflicts in detail
and submits that if the conflicts can be resolved in the mindof
the Court, they would be resolved in favor of the Appellants,
This being the case, Appellants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

We urge that the conflicts relate to genuine iss'.

of material facts to be reserved for the trier of facts.

Therefi

we further urge that the Court reverse the Sununary Judgment ofe
lower Court and remand the case for trial and allow Defendants
their day in Court.

·~ctfull.y/~SJfbm~ ted,

l I //
/. ..;1--d

~£,,__,

ohn c ."'/(;teen
~ torney for Appellants

Served two (2) copies of
the foregoing Brief of
Appellants on Respondent
by delivering to James H.
Faust at 721 Kearns
Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, .on this
day of
October, 1976.
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